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Abstract
In order to achieve a safe and systematic treatment of security protocols, organizations release a number of technical 
brieﬁngs describing how to detect and manage security incidents. A critical issue is that this document set may suffer from 
semantic deﬁciencies, mainly due to ambiguity or different granularity levels of description and analysis. An approach to 
face this problem is the use of semantic methodologies in order to provide better Knowledge Externalization from incident 
protocols management. In this article, we propose a method based on semantic techniques for both, analyzing and specifying 
(meta)security requirements on protocols used for solving security incidents. This would allow specialist getting better 
documentation on their intangible knowledge about them.
Keywords: Incidents, security, semantic technologies, knowledge management.
1 Introduction
A key organizational activity in Security for Information Systems (SIS) is the document generation, 
spreading and management, for both employees and clients (see e.g. Microsoft document [24]). The 
documents meet several purposes: spread information within and outside the organization, facilitate 
self-learning within the organization, make explicit tacit knowledge on incident management, isolate 
emergent security concepts, etc. Documentation service provides robust strategies and secure solving 
methods to face a wide range of situations. Among the documents, these related with reports on 
incidents, protocols and information on systems can play a structural role in the SIS paradigm. 
Their role is not limited to Document Engineering (DE) as it covers several levels, for example, 
documentation, diffusion and self-learning among employees.
However, as it is said in Mace et al. [19], reports generally describe information security policies by 
mixing professional opinion, staff experience, technology manufacturer advice and external security 
standards or regulations. Therefore, it is natural to think that traditional and successful methods and 
policies have to be documented in order to get better knowledge externalization (KE) in the sense 
of the classic framework introduced by Nonaka and Takeuchi [23]. KE represents a clever strategy 
in SIS documentation since reports are useful mainly for organization members (which share the 
same tacit knowledge about this), and it is frequent that new paradigms force them to conciliate 
knowledge.
This scenario of deﬁcient KE contrasts with the current ubiquitous role of SIS, which has 
evolved from a technical discipline to a strategic concept (see e.g. US National Academic brieﬁng 
[22], Smith and Spafford [34] and, in the cloud paradigm, Catteddu and Hogben [9]). The world’s 
growing dependence on a powerful but vulnerable Internet—combined with the disruptive 
capabilities of cyberattackers—now threatens national and international security. Thus, it is even 
necessary to think on the problem from the point of view of Complex Systems Science (Sadvandi et 
al. [28]).
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In Geer’s book [13], inﬂuence factors in security incidents are summarized, showing the complex-
ity and hardness of the problem. Author juxtaposes cyberattack advantages and mitigation strategies 
according to their level of inﬂuence of one to the other. He presents different features of attacks at 
general level, and also considers SIS vulnerabilities and defences classiﬁed in different categories. 
The study suggests that a clear and robust classiﬁcation could provide a better defence position. 
Robust classiﬁcations have to be stable under comparisons with other approaches. Therefore, a sci-
entiﬁc approach to cybersecurity is indispensable, even as a target for (e-Semantic) Science, covering 
seven interrelated themes (see Riley [32]): Common Language, Core Principles, Attack Analysis, 
Measurable Security, Risk, Agility and Human Factors. All of these themes converge in document 
representation in SIS.
The other challenge associated with SIS documentation is the potentially vast number of disparate 
information sources, which makes the management of SIS information complex and time-consuming 
(cf. also Mace et al. [19]). Although KE consolidates the knowledge within individual organizations, 
it is typically kept ‘in-house’ and the interoperability among different organizations could be a 
challenge. That is to say, it may suffer of interoperability issues, most of them of semantic nature. 
This gap makes harder to exploit SIS documentation of an organization by others or its effective 
spreading, a problem related with the global nature of SIS challenges.
1.1 Semantic methods for SIS
Semantic web technologies (SWT) can provide an uniﬁed point of view solving the aforementioned 
problems. It is important to point out that SWT can be viewed as both, a technology and a sci-
entiﬁc discipline for knowledge representation and reasoning (KRR), which facilitates knowledge 
extraction, representation, management and even reasoning, instead of a discipline focused only 
on Ontology Engineering. The last viewpoint is very useful to face the above challenges by con-
sidering those as Knowledge Management Problems grounded on DE (cf. Glushko and McGrath 
[14]).
By focusing on the theme of this article, two related tasks matter. On the one hand, the attempt 
to formalize the information described in the reports provides knowledge emergence. On the other 
hand, SWT naturally solve interoperability problems by means of KE. Consensus efforts to rep-
resent document’s knowledge by means of ontologies and data allow engineers and employees 
getting a sound understanding of ideas (which can be externalized), represented by means of 
concepts, properties and axioms of the ontology. Therefore, the problem of understanding the 
structure of concepts to anticipate potential issues of document information may be solved by 
the joint work of KRR specialists and security experts. Such solutions could be provided dur-
ing activities driven to ontology creation, instead of only exploiting the ﬁnal product, i.e. the 
ontology.
Additionally, SWT provide tools for analysing important features as, for instance, consistency, 
compliance with current Security Standards, as well as the ﬁdelity with the intended model (see e.g. 
Aranda et al. [3] in SIS, and Alonso et al. [2] in general). The latter feature is based on a sound 
representation of some concepts, i.e. to say, whether the speciﬁcation represents the intentions 
of security experts and whether there are axioms (or properties) clearly incompatible with real 
concepts. Therefore, the ontology-based approach enables the deﬁnition of security concepts and 
their dependencies in an understandable way for both humans and software agents (see Pereira et al.
[27]).
[14:47 14/11/2016 jzw055.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job: JIGPAL Page: 918 916–932
1.2 Aim of the article
The aim of the article is to exploit SWT and associated methods, in the analysis and reﬁnement of 
knowledge from security reports. The idea is to get better documentation by means of a semantic 
evaluation and improvement proposals. The idea bases the process of ontology creation on infor-
mation contained in the documents.
The document set published by Spanish INTECO–CERT institution1 has been selected as run-
ning example: INTECO’s identiﬁcation and report of security incident for strategic operators [36] 
and The operator console. A Basic Guide to Critical Infrastructure Protection [37]. The ﬁrst one 
aims to be a guide intended to serve as a manual for action reporting and management related to 
Critical Infrastructure and Strategic Operators incidents through the INTECO–CERT. The second 
one describes the actions that operators have to perform in order to provide an effective and efﬁ-
cient response to security incidents. The documents provide a standardized protocol effort for both, 
effectively solving and documenting security incidents in a SIS scenario.
1.3 Structure of the article
The structure of the article is as follows. The next section is devoted to analyse relevant features 
in security documentation, with particular emphasis on the use of ﬂowchart descriptions as main 
tool in processes description. In Section 3, the strategy we propose is described. In Section 4, 
some relevant results on the application of the strategy to a speciﬁc case (an Incident Report and 
Identiﬁcation document) are reviewed. Section 5 provides some hints about the evaluation of the 
strategy within Knowledge Management Framework. Lastly, some conclusions on both the strategy 
and its applications are discussed (Section 6).
This article is an extended version of the work by Borrego et al. [8].
2 Semantic features of security documentation
The analysis of SIS documents has to be performed from different points of view, by distinguishing
between classiﬁcation of SIS elements (e.g. identiﬁcation of incidents) and the description level of
security protocols (for reporting or solving incidents). The representation of different features will
provide essential elements (classes and particular individuals) for the ontology in a natural way.
Due to the modular nature of the ontology, it should be allowed to extend or modify these elements
without a general reconsideration of ontological commitments. To achieve this modularity, the top
level of the ontology have to conciliate both points of view (identiﬁcation and reporting), while
low-level classes will represent a set of particular elements (usable actions, speciﬁc protocols, a
set of possible identiﬁcations and classiﬁcations, etc.). Identiﬁcation and protocol descriptions have
different ontological nature although they share some common features allowing to articulate the
ontology in two sub-hierarchies.
Although it would be possible to specify identiﬁcation and resolution protocols by means of
standard service ontologies (e.g. OWL-S or WSMO), a speciﬁc ﬂowchart-based light ontological
description of protocols is created instead. The reasons of this choice are justiﬁed by the particular
features of SIS documents as well as by the details of protocol description within them:
• Description (at operator level) is simpler than that of standard service ontologies: a succinct
and clear speciﬁcation is better to understand protocols than a complete one. It is also more
adequate for pragmatic representation of solutions.
1Acronym of Spanish Incident Response Center Security http://www.inteco.es/home/national_communications_
technology_institute/
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• The representation of protocols in documents is very similar to their natural (graphical) descrip-
tions, making them easily understandable by operators and, in general, by any SIS organization
member.
• A concise semantic description of the protocols which does not add complexity to reasoning
services is provided.
• Because of natural mapping between actions and their corresponding ontological representation,
the addition of new actions/description elements does not require SWT experts.
A secondary goal of the formalization of ﬂowcharts is that the insertion of a new ﬂowchart in
the systems will be guided by the requisites ﬂowchart ontology has (which can be understood as
questions to be completed by the user). Since the ﬂowchart ontology will be used, it is interesting
to brieﬂy describe it.
2.1 A view on the ﬂowchart ontology
Flowcharts are the standard way to represent processes, or, in general, almost every kind of protocols
involving dynamics in terms of state changes. Flowchart is designed as a directed graph in which
nodes are represented by boxes and edges (arcs) are represented by arrows showing the process ﬂow
in the diagram.
The dynamic dimension of semantic analysis of SIS guides will be obtained by means of a
ﬂowchart-based representation of protocols. The version of the basic concept on the ontology is
depicted in INTECO terms in Figure 1 from [36]. A singular feature of the ontology is the identiﬁ-
cation betweenAtomicAction andFlowchartAction classes. This non-orthodox equivalence
is the result of a group discussion among authors. Ontological distinction between action and repre-
sentation of the action within ﬂowcharts is discarded. In this way action class is used in both levels,
and non-experts in Ontology Engineering will understand the ﬂowchart better.
There are multiple variants of ﬂowcharts (Petri nets, ASM charts and so on). The simplest one
only uses two types of nodes (boxes): Action boxes and Decision boxes. The ﬁrst ones contain a set
of actions that the user should execute in that state, therefore an action box must have one and only
one output path. They are represented by the class ActionBox in our ontology.
The second kind of boxes are the Decision ones, where the inner text is a condition to be veriﬁed.
The next current state depends on the value at which the condition may be evaluated (the condition is
not a logic formular to be evaluated within the ontology, it is represented as a simple text). This kind
of nodes can have multiple output paths. Decision boxes are modelled by the class DecisionBox
in our ontology. Figure 1 shows the hierarchy of classes of the sub-ontology. It can be understood
that ActionBox and DecisionBox are subclasses of a more generic concept, which we have
called InnerBox (representing the internal nodes of a ﬂowchart). In this way some restrictions on
FIG. 1. Flowchart box element class.
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the classes can be added, as for instance:
ActionBox (=1 hasOutputPath.Path), DecisionBox (≥1 hasOutputPath.Path)
Some types of ﬂowcharts have two special nodes. Those that do not have an input path (i.e. 
input degree in the graph is equal to zero) and those that do not have an output path (i.e. ouput 
degree is zero). These nodes are represented in our ﬂowchart ontology by means of StartBox and 
EndBox classes, respectively. We can enforce these constraints making these classes subtypes of 
OutputPathBox and InputPathBox:
InputPathBox∃  hasInputPath.Path, OutputPathBox∃  hasOutputPath.Path
Thus, an instance of InnerBox must inherit both restrictions:
InnerBox∃  hasInputPath.Path, InnerBox∃  hasOutputPath.Path
Some other key concepts and classes of this ontology are Condition and Pathwith the natural 
associated semantics.
As it was already mentioned, there exists a number of ontologies that could be used for ﬂowchart 
semantic representation. Among them, similar approaches to be presented here are related with the 
representation of industrial/business processes. Also the ﬂowchart concept appears in biotechnology 
ontologies as, e.g. in the National Cancer Institute Thesaurus,2 Semanticscience Integrated Ontology3 
and SWEET Governance Ontology4, among others approaches.
3 A strategy for KE from incident reports
The goal is to enrich KE processes by means of Ontology Extraction processes. In this article, we 
propose a strategy for ontology extraction to accomplish this aim. The strategy consists of four 
stages (Figure 2):
Stage 1: Preliminary analysis: In this stage, activities are closely related with the rough under-
standing of goals and reports structure of the organization:
1. To state the scope and intended use of SIS document. A ﬁrst distinction between description-
oriented and solution-oriented protocols and methods is made.
2. Document analysis. Ontology engineers analyse the logical structure of the document and
isolate main concepts used within it.
3. To determine the ontological nature of different concepts. Elaboration of a ﬁrst categorization
(possibly by building several hierarchies).
4. To ﬁnd potential ambiguities or deﬁciencies in elements to be included in the ontology.
The Results expected in Stage 1 are related with the above analysis; formal and speciﬁc deﬁnitions
are still not required. These are focused on the understanding of:
• Scope and Intended use.
• A high-level categorization, a ﬁrst set of concepts extracted from document analysis and a
ﬁrst approach on the relationship structure among the different elements.
2http://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies/NCIT
3https://code.google.com/p/semanticscience/wiki/SIO
4http://wiki.esipfed.org/index.php/SWEET_Governance
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FIG. 2. Strategy applied to SIS documents.
• Above results may reveal potential errors. They are compiled to be solved later.
Stage 2: Ontology creation activities: The adoption of a pre-existent security ontology to formalize
and clarify the SIS documentation, does not seem a sound approach, given the goals. The main reason
is that it describes an approach to SIS report/classiﬁcation that could be incompatible with the tacit
knowledge (in particular intangible assets) of the organization. Since the main goal is KE instead
of the production of a stable ontology, the activities to be performed in this stage are classic steps
in ontology building:
• Hierarchies and properties implementation (e.g. using Protégé).
• Design of axioms (classes speciﬁcation) for the key concepts.
• Study of relationships between sub-hierarchies devoted to different KRR problems (e.g.
descriptions and methods).
Results expected in this stage are:
• An explicit representation of Hierarchy and Properties
• Axiom design (only natural axioms are added here), some of them devoted to describe
properties between hierarchies
Stage 2 produces a ﬁrst formal approach of tacit knowledge from SIS organization through the
documentation. This approach allows SWT experts confronting this issue with other known repre-
sentations (mainly ontologies).
Representability of security issues. The proposed bottom-up approach is the natural choice as
it is not primarily intended to build a (other) security ontology. The aim is to build an explicit
representation of tacit consensual knowledge (concepts, methods, relations) in reports documentation
within an organization (this ontology may be a consensus on concepts and terms). Since bottom-up
ontology building strategy is grounded on security information resources, and, since these kind of
resources have not been designed to ﬁt ontological structures, several deﬁciencies of representation
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TABLE 1. Representational problems in Information Security
[P1:] No concepts for some kind of vulnerabilities [P2:] Vague connections between threats and controls
[P3:] No relationships between threats [P4:] Inconsistent granularity of information
[P5:] Redundancy and overlapping of information
arise. In [11], Fenz and Ekelhart detect a number of representational problems when enriching a
security ontology by means of Information Security (see Table 1). The bottom-up process aids to
solve most of these problems (P1,P2,P4,P5), while problem P3 rests explicitly posed (to be solved
by SIS experts). It is worthy to note that the adaptation of a general security ontology for this task
is hard to automate, because some revision criteria cannot be fully formalized.
Stage 3: Comparison with standard security ontologies: The activities are driven to repair, reﬁne
and enrich the knowledge extracted in the above stage. The comparison strongly depends on a number
of KRR issues. Likewise it is worth to note that the task has to be made both automatic (e.g. by
merge-ontology tool of Protégé) and manually (by discussing other non-directed relationship among
classes). In this case, manual comparison is essential because engineers attempt to redeﬁne security
concepts for standardizing emergent concept with previously established ones in other ontologies.
Results expected are encompassed in an analysis on the relationship between the prototype ontol-
ogy and well-known Security Ontologies, Security Categorizations and in general other ICT Stan-
dards [6, 11, 16, 19, 26, 27, 30, 33].
Stage 4: Semantic evaluation report (with improvement proposals): Each step requires some
discussion on features of key concepts. Such discussion has to be documented in the ﬁnal report. The
use of the ontology as a semantic reference of future SIS documents has to be taken into account.
Activities: SWT engineers have to document all the tasks and decisions of the strategy, concluding
with a document on recommendations.
Results expected are oriented to the client (SIS organization), by documenting the strategy and
results: a semantic evaluation report which includes improvement proposals. Finally, an ontology
prototype documentation is provided, if experts consider that it is interesting to publish the ontology.
4 A case study: Applying the strategy to Incident Report and Identiﬁcation
documents
This section is devoted to summarize some observations about the selected stages of the strategy,
as well as to discuss the main conclusions on the application of the presented strategy to (Incident
Report and Identiﬁcation) IRD documents [36, 37].
4.1 Phases of incident response. Some results from Stage 1
According to [36], the description of the main phases in incident response and mitigation of risk
are (see Figure 1, from the document [36]): Identiﬁcation (classiﬁcation), contention and mitigation,
evidence preservation and legal considerations, documentation and recovery. The elements of these
phases have different nature. On the one hand, classiﬁcation and identiﬁcation have static nature
while actions correspond to protocols (non-complex plans).
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4.2 Static versus Dynamic dimension (from Stage 1, activity 2)
Preliminary analysis of documents (stage 1) shows that two particular ontological dimensions are
combined. The ﬁrst one refers to (statical) identiﬁcation of main elements. This fact is important
due to the fact that solving/repairing/mitigation methods strongly depend in the secure identiﬁcation
of the incident, which depends on turn of the classiﬁcation of them. Despite that, it is hard to
state the complex relationship among different categories. SIS documents often enumerate elements
appearing in a particular organization, and themethods often depend on such classiﬁcation. However,
reﬁnements of the categorization aid to specify the methods.
4.3 Ontology creation activities (from Stage 2)
Stage 2 includes the description of dynamic elements, e.g. protocols andmethods. A protocol descrip-
tion is more precise than risk identiﬁcation. This observation suggests building a ﬂowchart-based
sub-ontology in order to describe them. This ontology was described in Section 2.1. Likewise, an
ontology on the incidents and processes described in the document was built. As it was already
mentioned, such ontology represents a formal description, useful to compare intangible knowledge
from the document with other well-established formal representations from the following stage.
4.3.1 Logical speciﬁcation of meta-security in IRD (from Stage 2)
Speciﬁcation of the ontology opens the possibility of including constraints that would be included in
the SIS documentation (in natural language). Some of them would allow to monitor integrity/safety
constraints. For example, the system only considers as detected incident the one for which it has an
evidence:
Detection≡∃hasEvidence.Evidence
Likewise, ﬂowchart semantic speciﬁcation allows instantiating protocols, making each one a com-
plete and consistent representation of a security method. In particular, only ﬂowcharts representing
approved methods can be included:
FlowChart (≥1 represents.Action)
where Action≡AtomicActionunionsqProceduralAction. The absence of classiﬁcation of an
incident is prevented by a restriction axiom on the property originIn:
Incident (=1 originIn.Risk)
4.4 Analysing features by comparison with other ontologies (Stage 3)
This step includes evaluating the compatibility of implicit knowledge within INTECO–CERT doc-
ument with other formalized approaches. The semantic description of SIS has a great advantage that
allows comparing the INTECO–CERT approach to risks with other related classiﬁcations and/or
ontologies, in order to evaluate its soundness—speciﬁcally by ontological mapping with other pre-
existent risk hierarchies. This way analysis can be beneﬁted from the comparison in order to: detect
important absences in risks catalogue, isolate redundancies, explicitly reﬂect about particular risks
as well as the possibility to propose other ontologies enrichment. It is worth to note that concept
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FIG. 3. Risk class and its relationship with categories from Smith et al. [33].
mapping between these general categories and the INTECO–CERT ones provides insights useful to
enrich the description of action classes related with them. Those indications could be incorporated
in the ﬁnal documentation.
It is particularly interesting to consider its relationship with the following six general categories of
information technology risk (according to Smith et al. [33]). The relationship among both categories
is depicted in Figure 3. This relationship has to be understood as a set of incipient reﬁnements of
the ontology. Nevertheless, it is interesting to highlight some of them:
• Malicious code and programs: The concept contains MalwareInfection. Thus, the ontol-
ogy could be expanded by adding classes to prevent risks. It requires protection at the individual
and system level.
• Malicious hacking and intrusion: contains Hacking and InvasionAttack. However,
INTECO classiﬁcation also considers malicious hacking without intrusion (RefusalOf
Service).
• Fraud and deception: According to Smith et al. [33] various forms of attacks in the form
of spooﬁng, masquerading or salami attacks have been used to damage privacy. Common
electronic forms of fraud include phishing and credit card theft. The ﬁrst type corresponds
to SocialMalware and part of Hacking while the second one correspond to Social
Engineering. In this case the ontology is more speciﬁc than the category from [33]. In
Figure 3, dashed line indicates that:
HackingFraudAndDeception 	≡⊥
• Misuse and sabotage: Closely relatedwithVulnerability. It also contains the classPolicy
Violation. The ﬁrst class is one of the underspeciﬁed concepts in INTECO–CERT. The
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TABLE 2. Viability analysis
Business viability High. It is straitghforward to show advantages and the expected added
value.
Technical viability High. Technical documentation has a semistructured form, which facilitates
the application of the strategy.
Project viability Actions described in the stages are feasible and it is expected that
organization teams accept reasoned changes and methods.
original category from [33] represents the resources that can be misused, or vandalized through
unauthorized access. One form is unauthorized software changes.
• Errors and omissions: Closely related with Vulnerability. According to Smith [33], this
category assumes accidental (software) errors, to include unintended destruction of ﬁles or data,
as well as routing or transmission errors. This also includes programming errors. Thus, it seems
that Vulnerability class has not a good granularity level in INTECO document.
• Physical and environmental hazard: It is out of the scope of the Risk class of [36].
The ontological analysis of this kind of relationships among categorizations can be also made
in other parts of the ontology, by using other similar security ontologies. Even it can induce to
distinguish between safety and security, in order to reﬁne ontology in some SIS scenarios (Chapon
et al. [29]).
A more detailed classiﬁcation and description of risks needs the formal inclusion of damage
concept. This inclusion would force to reﬁne risk categories, as in Kim et al. [18]. Also, it is
interesting to reﬁne concepts about cyberattacks from Geers’ [13]. In this way, the inclusion of
target concept allows the introduction of new mitigation strategies at the dynamic level.
4.5 Dynamic ontological level
One of the INTECO–CERT tasks is the response to security incidents reported, as occurring in
Critical Infrastructures, by users of the service, ensuring that the relevant information is stored.
The description of the process follows the scheme shown in Figure 1 of [36], which can be fairly
represented by means of the ﬂowchart representation.
The stage of (internal) ontology articulation allows building semantic bridges among the sub-
ontologies. In fact, descriptional and dynamic ontologies share concepts of common ontological
nature. This step produces the reﬁnement of the high level of the ontology.
4.6 On ontology population
With respect to ontology population, two main kinds of individuals for ontology population can
be extracted from documents (protocols and incidents). Ontology tools provide interfaces to guide
operators in the population of different classes. In fact, populating security ontology with methods
and use cases also suggests the need of extending the information of the document. It is important to
consider a description of detection mechanisms with the aim of detecting anomalies in the operating
system itself, namely the HIDS (host-based intrusion detection systems) in [37]. The idea is that
HIDS provides a complete incident description. This consideration induces to think that Agent
contains humans and artiﬁcial agents.
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TABLE 3. General features of the strategy
Facet Feature Evaluation
Inﬂuence of the
application domain
Critical environment High. Although it is a critical environment,
conclusions come from ontology
speciﬁcations that comes in turn of
company’s knowledge.
Acceptability by
end-users
High. Ontology has its origin in the
speciﬁcation of organizational culture on
reports.
Partial acceptability High. Knowledge provided by ontology
analysis is modular: It is possible to
isolate partial recommendations if
necessary.
Each stage High. Any phase interact with SIS systems,
therefore only stage 4 can be considered
as an inﬂuence phase.
Validation As experimental task Performed on historical cases (former
security incidents)
As a KE method High. Once document recommendations are
accepted, the product and documentation
of the strategy rests integrated in the
documentation ecosystem of the
company.
Synthesis of new
concepts
New concepts and
procedures
Medium. Simulation (non-experimental)
against SIS operators could be performed.
4.7 On results of Stage 4
The ontology speciﬁcation opens the possibility of including constraints, which would be included
in SIS documentation. Actions and indications proposed to the organization from the previous two
stages are collected, and speciﬁc elements of action are recommended: in what areas reﬂection on
the current documentation should focus, as well as which is the recommended ﬁnal solution in each
case, etc.
5 Evaluation
Since the process aims to debug and clarify security reports by means of their correct speciﬁcations
(by using ontologies as tools), the evaluation of the method should be based on report authors’
feedback (validation by the domain expert). A secondary product (the ontology containing formal
speciﬁcations) is useful to compare reports knowledge with that represented by standard ontologies
on both facets, the scope and the intended use (validation by the knowledge engineer): ontology
soundness produced by means of this strategy is useful to revise the report itself. Thus, the ontology
is, in this case, a tool instead of a goal. Although the use of ontologies built from standard security
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TABLE 4. Evaluating the strategy as a KM process according to KM2 initiatives
Objectives Qualitative evaluation of the
proposed strategy (outside of
the scope, low, medium, high)
Culture KM is an integral part of the
organisational culture
Outside of the scope, not
considered
KM enables collaboration
between experienced and
inexperienced personnel
High. It enables collaboration by
means of improving
documentation
KM encourages and facilitates
the exchange of
organizational knowledge
High
Organization KM deﬁnes the organisational
structure
Outside of the scope
KM supports interdepartmental
collaboration
Regular. Strategy does not propose
interdepartamental teams
KM supports the collaboration
between employees and
managers
Low. Indirect support by means of
stage 4 recommendations
Methods KM practices are integrated into
knowledge-intensive work
processes
Low. Process is external to
organization
KM supports the integrative
(synchronised) approach to
managing implicit and
explicit knowledge assets
Outside of the scope of the method
KM supports the exploration,
innovation, dissemination
and automation of knowledge
Low. Indirect support. Medium if
ontology is ﬁnished and
published
Processes KM supports the establishment
of continuous business
processes
Outside of the scope
KM supports the reduction of
work processing time
Low. Indirect, because describe
better identiﬁcation procedures
KM supports the avoidance of
work redundancy
Low. Indirect: better classiﬁcation
of security incident allows
solving procedures
descriptions are very useful to enhance the behaviour of multiagent systems for security issues (see
e.g. Herrero et al. [15]), its use is out of the topic of this article.
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TABLE 5. Evaluating the strategy as a KA process
Features of KA extraction Evaluation of the proposed strategy
Preprocessing requirement Lesser requirements. Only the avaibility of
technical reports on SIS
Ontology reusability Low. Ontology is a secondary result and it is very
speciﬁc
Extraction level High. Due to the qualitiy of technical reports
Degree of automation Low. In fact only in Ontology comparison
automated tools assist to analysts in Stage 3
Algorithm selection Not considered
Efﬁciency Not considered
Reliability Only changes on intern knowledge of tech reports
have to be evaluated against domain experts
The abovementioned features do not represent the overall framework to evaluate the strategy: its
evaluation of the proposed strategy can be considered from other important aspects. The strategy
is, in fact, a knowledge management (KM) one. Also the strategy can be viewed as a knowledge
acquisition (KA) method, thus it could be evaluated in this classic framework (cf. Shadbolt et al.
[31]). Therefore, evaluation is a risky and complex issue.
The aforementioned observations lead us to consider three features. The ﬁrst and third ones are
related to its KA nature whilst the second one considers its KM nature.
Viability analysis. While results are evaluated by using the documents generated in Stage 4,
it is also interesting to consider whether the application of the strategy has high impact on the
organization. See Table 2 where a summary on three types of viability analysis is shown.
Evaluating the strategy itself. This facet addresses to its nature as KM Method. Table 3 collects
the main conclusions on this point of view. From the point of view of KM processes, qualitative
evaluation according to the prospectivemonitoring process KM2 is described in Table 4 (seeMinonne
and Turner [21]). From the point of the view of KA (by considering the strategy as an ontology-based
method), evaluation is described in Table 5 (according Park et al. [25]).
Evaluating the results. It is related with the results. Evaluation by KE engineer and third-party
experts is implicit in Stage 3 since ontologies built by other experts are considered. Domain experts
evaluation is necessary in order to estimate how results of Stage 4 are accepted in the way Table 4
addreses it. Also, the limitation of evaluation against other KE experts to ontology comparison
prevents superhuman fallacy (cf. Chandrasekaran’s [10]) issues. Also, it could be interesting to use
contingency tables in the evaluation against domain experts.
6 Conclusions
The idea of applying Ontological Engineering to SIS is supported by a number of security ontolo-
gies with different features and scope (see Blanco et al. [6] for a general vision of the ﬁeld). The
article shows how ontology creation from security reports—instead of selecting a standard secu-
rity ontology—enables the use of formal methods assuring their safety, by clarifying processes and
descriptions. As it was mentioned in the introduction, the goal is not to build (another) ontology on
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security, nor to reproduce a standard method to extract one ontology from a document. The goal 
con-sists in exploiting the ontology creation process itself in order to clarify and revise security 
reports by reusing knowledge from a number of pre-existent security ontologies. Similar 
conclusions were obtained in other ﬁelds where similar semantic strategies were applied (Borrego 
et al. [7]). In fact, the strategy presented in the present work shares some tasks with NeOn 
methodology for the sce-nario where Reusing and Re-engineering non-ontological resources are 
necessary (Sua´rez-Figueroa et al. [35]).
The methodology presented in the article is not intended to be applied in documents explaining 
methodologies (e.g. Akrout et al. [1]). The methodology is related to the documentation of their 
pragmatic application at the operators level, with intra-organization scope. In fact, KE from 
incident reports authored by organization members would produce ontologies where the inﬂuence 
of human behaviour in SIS activities exists (e.g. in the population of ﬂowchart instances) but it is 
not explicitly stated (as in others as, for example, Parkin et al. [26]).
The ontology is not the primary goal. The extraction of ontologies from SIS reports represents an 
excellent method to standardize and debug SIS knowledge; the application of ontology extraction 
(OE) methods is useful to reﬂect and reﬁne SIS documentation and protocols. Security ontologies 
are built in the traditional fashion used in OE, while our approach is the reuse of OE methods to 
validate reports in IRD framework. Of course, an information security ontology should deﬁne the 
most important security issues, concepts and the relationships among them. Therefore, reports as 
those analysed here, should describe such elements. Thus, OE methods will produce ontologies, 
which are comparable with the former ones. The soundness of the report can be estimated, by 
means of this comparison, in order to induce reﬁnements or reparations. Stage 3 is devoted to this 
task.
For example, it is interesting to compare the ontology with the Security Ontology (SO)5 from 
Herzog et al. [16]. This ontology and the ontological elements, created during the strategy, com-
plement each other with features as risk identiﬁcation (from ours to the SO) and countermeasures 
analysis (from the SO to ours). It is evident that the countermeasure ontology from SO is richer than 
INTECO’s [36], although it can be useful as addenda of the document.
In this article, the merging of the ontology with other—as for example that of Mace et al. [19]—
is not considered. However, this would allow its expansion by analysing the relationship between 
human behavioral factors (and other concerns within information security management). The main 
reason for discarding it is that the proposed strategy is KE oriented, thus the inclusion of a relevant 
number of external concepts would distort the proper process of KE. A more suitable approach 
would be to assist the strategy with collaborative documentation tools from Knowledge Intensive 
Process (see Aranda-Corral et al.’s works[4, 5]). These tools bridge the knowledge gap between 
SWT experts and SIS experts.
If standardization efforts are part of the organization strategic plans, it could be interesting to 
consider in Stage 2 the relationship with security ontologies, in order to formalize (by means of a 
tool) the comparison with ISO 17799 standard for security (which involves ten security domains. 
See Microsoft’s [20]). This particular relationship is important since it suggests the human operator, 
which tends to converge with international standards. In fact, ontology mapping plays a key role in 
this approach (as it is shown in Fenz et al [12]).
Lastly, it is worthy to mention that the strategy proposed in this article could be adapted to 
other Knowledge Intensive Methods for information spreading, as for example, in cross-enterprise 
collaboration approaches, particularly those where semantics can play a key role: business process 
management and knowledge externalization. Efforts for exploiting semantic web methodologies
5http://www.ida.liu.se/∼iislab/projects/secont/
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in the ﬁrst approach represent a cornerstone to achieve true knowledge transmision and sharing 
[17]. In this way Business Process Modelling (BPM) in non OE scenarios could be enhanced with 
similar results than those from SIS ﬁeld. In this case it is possible that the extracted ontology may 
be completed in order to be standard to BPM, enabling automated composition and planning of 
processes with robustness.
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